Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

State of Utah v. Paul Anthony Cerroni : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Wayne a. Freestone; Parker; Freestone & Angerhofer; Attorney for Appellant.
Attorney General Office; Appellate Division, Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Cerroni, No. 980217 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1481

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THB UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No: 980217-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No: 2
Defendant Not
Incarcerated

PAUL ANTHONY CERRONI
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE L.A. DEVER PRESIDING
Wayne A. Freestone
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER
Bank One Tower
'50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-5600

ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE
Appellate Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City,U

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH

OOCUMENT
KFU
50
&CKETNO.i»0^-<,fo

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUN2 4 1998
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

BASIS OF JURISDICTION

.

1

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

RELEVANT PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

NATURE OF THE CASE
COURSE OF PROCEEDING
DISPOSITION BELOW

2
2
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

7

I.

II.

UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER BRUCE GRAHAM DID NOT
HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE OR A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP APPELLANT'S VEHICLE

7

OFFICER GRAHAM HAD NO RIGHT TO CONDUCT A
PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF CERRONI

12

III. CERRONI DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PULL THE
WATCH FROM HIS POCKET
IV.

OFFICER GRAHAM HAD NO RIGHT TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE
OBJECT IN CERRONI'S POCKET ONCE HE WAS CONVINCED
IT WAS NOT A WEAPON

CONCLUSION

16

17
18

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United States Supreme Court
Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)

8,12,15

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)

9

Utah and other Decisions
State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992)

1

State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996)

17

U.S. v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988)

9

State v. Lopes. 552 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1976)

1

State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)

8

State v. Matison. 875 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1994)

8,10

State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987)

9

State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990)

9

State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1990)

8

State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)

13

State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980)

16

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No: 980217-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Priority No: 2
Defendant Not
Incarcerated

PAUL ANTHONY CERRONI
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE L.A. DEVER PRESIDING
Wayne A. Freestone
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER
Bank One Tower
50 West 300 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-5600

ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE
Appellate Division
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl.
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City,Utah 84114-0856

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

I N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.

:

:
:
:
:

PAUL ANTHONY CERRONI
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No: 980217-CA

Priority No: 2
Defendant Not
Incarcerated

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court
of appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(e). Cerroni
also appeals as a matter of right under Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err when it denied Cerroni's Motion to
Suppress and erroneously found the search legal and consented to
by Cerroni? When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or
deny a motion to suppress, this court will uphold the trial
court's underlying findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1976); State v.
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES AND RULES

United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n Amendment IV

8

Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n A r t . 1 §14

8

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) ( I )

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Appellant (hereinafter "Cerroni") entered a plea of guilty to
possession of a controlled substance on January 21, 1998, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Cerroni entered
this plea after an Order denying Cerroni's Motion to Suppress was
entered in the trial court on April 13, 1998, and signed Nunc Pro
Tunc to August 25, 1997. The plea was conditioned upon an appeal
being filed on the Order of the Court denying the Cerroni's Motion
to Suppress.

In the event that Cerroni's appeal is successful his

plea will be set aside. Cerroni was sentenced on March 9, 1998.
Cerroni is now appealing that Order because of the arguments
contained herein.
B. COURSE OP PROCEEDINGS:
Appellant filed and argued a Motion to Suppress. An Order
denying the Motion was entered in the trial court. Appellant then
entered a plea of guilty conditioned upon appealing the Order.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT:
The trial court heard argument on the Motion to Suppress and

entered an Order denying Defendant's Motion. The trial court
accepted a plea of guilty and sentenced Defendant. Defendant is
not incarcerated at this time.

2

D.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
On or about September 21, 1996, Appellant (hereinafter

"Cerroni") was stopped by Utah Highway Patrol Officer Bruce Graham
(hereinafter "Graham") for an alleged equipment violation. Graham
alleged that he stopped Cerroni because the rear license plate on
Cerroni's vehicle was not illuminated, the right tail light was
inoperable, and the reverse lights in the rear of the vehicle were
broken off and there were no light bulbs in them.

(Transcript of

Motion to Suppress at 6; hereinafter "Motion to Suppress").
Graham's patrol vehicle was parked perpendicular to Cerroni's path
of travel.

(Motion to Suppress at 6).

In other words, Graham was

able to see intricate details on the rear of Cerroni's vehicle,
such as a cracked tail light cover and missing reverse light
bulbs, when it was traveling by his parked vehicle late at night.
It is interesting that Graham testified that he could see that the
reverse lights' bulbs were missing even though Cerroni was not
driving in reverse.
Graham then pulled his vehicle behind and followed Cerroni
for a distance of two to four blocks and effectuated a stop of
Cerroni's vehicle. (Motion to Suppress at 7:46).

Following the

stop, Graham approached the driver's side of Cerroni's vehicle and
testified that he saw a number of open containers of alcohol
inside the vehicle. (Motion to Suppress at 7:8)
Graham testified that he asked Cerroni to exit and walk to
the rear of his vehicle for "two reasons: One to check for Driving
3

Under the Influence of alcohol or drugs, and number two, to search
for and retrieve the open containers."

(Motion to Suppress at 8).

Graham never investigated the open containers in the back of
Cerroni's vehicle. Graham testified that the reason he told
Cerroni to step from his vehicle was to "check [Cerroni] for
Driving Under the Influence and to search for and retrieve the
open containers"; Graham never investigated either of these
allegations. Once Graham learned that Cerroni was not driving
under the influence or decided not to further investigate driving
under the influence, Cerroni should have been free to leave.
Graham testified that as Cerroni was walking to the rear of
the vehicle, he informed Cerroni that he was going to pat him down
to make sure that he had no weapons.

(Motion to Suppress at 8).

Graham did this without any belief that Cerroni was armed and
presently dangerous. Graham's own testimony confirms this when he
stated that he knew that it was a watch in Cerroni's front pocket.
(Motion to Suppress at 10).

At the Suppression Hearing, Graham

denied that he performed a Terry frisk on Cerroni. (Motion to
Suppress at 17).

He testified that Cerroni just voluntarily

pulled the watch from his pocket when Graham asked him what it
was.

(Motion to Suppress at 17).

This testimony, however, was

directly contradicted by another officer that arrived to back-up
Graham.
Officer John Michael McMahon (hereinafter "McMahon")
testified that when he arrived on the scene, Graham was standing
near the driver's side window of Cerroni's vehicle.
4

(Motion to

Suppress at 24).

Shortly after McMahon's arrival, Cerroni was

asked to exit the vehicle. (Motion to Suppress at 24).

McMahon

testified that as Cerroni was walking to the rear of the vehicle,
Graham began to pat him down.

(Motion to Suppress at 25:33).

According to McMahon's testimony, just prior to the time
Graham began patting-down Cerroni, Graham asked Cerroni if he had
arrested him before for marijuana.
Transcript at 7).

(Preliminary Hearing

Cerroni responded that he had not been arrested

by Graham for marijuana in the past.

Id. Graham then looked at

McMahon and stated, "I believe we have arrested him before."
(Motion to Suppress at 32).

Graham also testified that he

continously asked Cerroni if he had arrested him before.

(Motion

to Suppress at 17, 18).
McMahon also testified that he knew the item in Cerroni's
pocket was not a weapon.

(Motion to Suppress at 33:34) He could

clearly see that it was round and sticking out of the pocket
roughly an inch—nothing that could have been a weapon. Moreover,
McMahon never felt threatened or in danger during the stop of
Cerroni.

(Motion to Suppress at 33).

This clearly demonstrates

that neither officer felt that Cerroni posed any threat to either
of them.
McMahon testified that Graham had informed him that he had
video taped the incident with his dash mounted video camera and
had reviewed the video in preparation for the Preliminary Hearing.
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 13;Motion to Suppress at 3638).

This video would have shown the condition of Cerroni's
5

vehicle at the time of the stop, as well as the pat-down search
performed by Graham.
during Discovery.

This video was never produced by the State

Graham later testified that he did not believe

that he recorded the incident.

(Motion to Suppress at 20).

He

later admitted, however, that he may have given the tape to the
UHP secretary and did not know why it was not available.

(Motion

to Suppress at 21). The only tape made available to Cerroni was
the tape made by McMahon after Cerroni had been arrested and
placed in the back of McMahon's vehicle. This tape did show the
back of Cerroni's vehicle, but the license plate is not visible
because of an intercoding device. (Motion to Suppress at 42, 43).
This blurred section of the video screen is positioned exactly on
top of the license plate and tail lights. (Motion to Suppress at
42, 43).
Graham testified that as Cerroni pulled the watch from his
pocket, a baggy of what was later determined to be
methamphetamine, was pulled out at the same time.
Suppress at 10).

(Motion to

Graham reached for the baggy and pulled it out

of Cerroni's pocket.

(Motion to Suppress at 10).

At that point

Graham turned the investigation over to McMahon, and a short time
after that Cerroni was arrested for possession of a controlled
substance.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It is clear from the Record that Utah Highway Patrol Officer
Bruce Graham stopped Appellant for an alleged equipment violation
with no probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion that
6

Appellant was violating any laws.

There was evidence presented

that the officer had made a video recording of the stop and that
the State failed to produce the video during Discovery.

Had the

State produced the video tape of the stop, Appellant's assertion
that the stop was not valid would have been clear at the
Suppression Hearing.

It is clear that the officer had an ulterior

motive for the stop when he continuously asked Appellant if he had
arrested him before for possession of marijuana. Because the stop
was not justified at its inception, any evidence derived from the
stop should have been suppressed by the trial court.
Graham did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Appellant was armed and presently dangerous. Graham's own
testimony indicates that he did not suspect that Appellant had
anything more than a watch in his pocket. Without such a
suspicion, Graham had no right to perform a Terry frisk—in fact,
no right to have even touched Appellant. Furthermore, even if a
proper and legal Terry frisk had been performed, once the officer
was assured there was no safety threat he could not inquire any
further into the pocket watch.

Therefore, Appellant argues that

his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and that the evidence
found during the illegal search should have been suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER BRUCE GRAHAM DID NOT HAVE
PROBABLE CAUSE OR A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO
STOP APPELLANT'S VEHICLE
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
7

guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures..." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The United States Supreme
Court has held that "stopping an automobile and detaining its
occupants constitutefs] a seizure within the meaning of [the
Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited
and the resulting detention is quite brief." Accord State v.
Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990)(Fourth Amendment rights
apply to traffic stops "regardless of the reason for the stop or
the brevity of the detention").
In order to determine whether an officer complied with the
Fourth Amendment, this Court will make a dual inquiry: (1) Was the
police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? And (2) Was
the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place'?" State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah
1994)(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
1879 (1968)).
In State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994), the
court held that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was not
'justified at its inception,' and was therefore in violation of
the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
The defendant in Matison was stopped after a deputy sheriff
witnessed his vehicle "fishtail" while exiting an interstate road.
The officer testified that he did not stop the defendant
initially, but rather waited some time and then stopped the
8

vehicle to investigate why he had fishtailed.

The Court held that

the officer's actions were not justified at the inception of the
stop, and thus the first prong was not satisfied, and therefore
the stop was illegal.
The second question under the dual inquiry asks whether the
resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.
In Matison, the Court held that "[0]nce a traffic stop is made,
the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Id. (Quoting
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983)).
The Court continued by quoting its previous decision in State v.
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990)(Discussing the permissible
length and scope of a traffic stop):
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer
check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has
produced a driver's license and evidence of entitlement to
use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on his way,
without being subjected to further delay by police for
additional questioning.'
(quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.
1988))
The Court continued by restating the principle found in Lopez,
supra,
regarding further detention by the police:
'Investigative questioning that further detains the driver
must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion
based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality
of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the
stop.'
9

(accord State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181f 183 (Utah 1987)).
The case at bar presents this Court with a similar situation
it faced in Matison, supra. Cerroni was not stopped based on
probable cause or a reasoncible, articulable suspicion that he had
committed any criminal or traffic violations.
Cerroni testified that he drove by Graham, late at night,
while his vehicle was parked perpendicular to his path of travel.
(Motion to Suppress at 6).

In spite of the darkness and the

direction he was facing, Graham testified that he could see that
the reverse light covers at the rear of the vehicle were broken
off and that there were no light bulbs in them, that the right
tail light was inoperable, and the rear license plate was not
illuminated.

Id.

Graham then pulled his vehicle behind and

followed Cerroni for approximately four blocks and effectuated a
stop of Cerroni's vehicle.

Id. Cerroni asks this simple question

to the Court: assuming arguendo, that the reverse-lights' bulbs
were missing, how could Graham have seen this at night if Cerroni
was not driving in reverse?

Cerroni also argues that his rear

license plate was illuminated.
As further evidence that Graham stopped Cerroni for reasons
other than traffic violations, Cerroni testified that immediately
after he rolled down his window Graham informed him that he knew
him. (Motion to Suppress at 47).

Both McMahon and Graham admitted

Graham recognized Cerroni from a prior marijauna arrest.
One of the officers that was present during the traffic stop
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(McMahon) testified that Graham informed him that he had reviewed
the video of the Cerroni stop that he had made with his dashmounted video camera.

(Preliminary Hearing at 13).

In fact,

McMahon testified that Graham had informed him that he had
reviewed the tape to figure out when he had asked Cerroni if he
had arrested him before. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 17).
During cross-examination, Graham was very evasive about the video
tape. He testified that he is not certain if one was made or if
one was what ever became of it. Again, McMahon clearly recalled
that Graham had informed him that he had reviewed the tape.
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 13, 17: Motion to Suppress at
36-38).
The State, however, failed to furnish Cerroni with this video
during Discovery, claiming that Graham never made a video of the
stop. Had Cerroni been furnished with the video during Discovery,
it would clearly show that his rear license plate was illuminated,
and that the crack in the tail light did not show any white light.
It is interesting to note that Graham never investigated the
reason he told Cerroni to exit the vehicle in the first place—
namely suspected Driving Under the Influence. Cerroni does not
argue that Graham had the right to investigate the alleged open
container of alcohol in the vehicle. Cerroni does argue, however,
that Graham never did investigate. Graham simply commanded
Cerroni to exit the vehicle and began patting-down his clothing.
Graham's stop of Cerroni's vehicle was not justified at its
inception.

It is clear from Graham's testimony that he did not
11

have probable cause or a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Cerroni was committing or had committed any criminal or traffic
violations.

Production of the video during discovery by the State

would have shown that the stop was not justified.

Because the

stop was tainted from the inception, the evidence derived in
violation of Cerroni's Fourth Amendment rights should have been
suppressed by the trial court.
POINT II
OFFICER GRAHAM HAD NO RIGHT TO CONDUCT A PAT-DOWN SEARCH
OF CERRONI
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968), refused to sanction any intrusion based on nothing more
substantial than "inarticulate hunches." Rather, a police officer
must, prior to instituting a frisk, reasonably conclude in light
of his experience that the unusual conduct he observes might
suggest danger.

Id. At 30.

The Terry Court held that a frisk was reasonable under
certain circumstances. Those circumstances include: (1) "where a
police officer observes unusual conduct" which he interprets "in
light of his experience" as indicating possible criminal activity
and present danger, (2) "where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and (3) where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
other's safety." (FN5) Id. At 30, 88 S.Ct. At 1884. The Court
stated that while different circumstances may require modification
12

of the Terry components, the lawfulness of every frisk remains
subject to the "central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security."
ISL At 19, S.Ct. At 1878-79 (emphasis added).
Prior to instituting a frisk, a police officer must conclude
in light of his experience that the unusual conduct he observes
might suggest criminal activity and danger.
1884.

Id. At 30, S.Ct. At

The officer does not need to base his conclusion that a

suspect is armed on absolute certainty, id. At 27, 88 S.Ct. At
1883, but rather depends on "whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety
or that of others was in danger." (FN6) Id. An officer must be
able to point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion." Id. At 21, 88 S.Ct. At 1880.
In State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987), the
court found the search performed by a police officer to be
unconstitutional.

In that case, the officer had seen the

defendant and two companions walking down the street. The officer
approached the trio and asked for their names and identification.
After supplying the officer with their names, the officer began
patting-down the defendant. The officer discovered a knife
strapped to the chest of defendant and he was subsequently charged
with possession of a dangerous weapon by an unauthorized person.
The court held the search unconstitutional [s]ince
13

Officer Beesley did not articulate reasonable objective facts
for suspecting [defendant] had engaged in or was about to
engage in criminal conduct, the balance between the public
interest in crime prevention and [defendant]'s right to
personal security and privacy tilts to protect [defendant]
from this unreasonable police interference. Officer
Beesley's detention of [defendant] was unreasonable within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Inasmuch as we hold the
seizure of [defendant] unconstitutional, Officer Beesley had
no right to conduct a pat-down search of [defendant] and,
therefore, the knife should have been suppressed on
[defendant]'s motion.
Id. At 90.
During the Motion to Suppress Hearing, Graham never testified
that he observed any unusual conduct that might suggest, to a
reasonable officer, that Cerroni was a danger to Graham or anyone
else.

Graham testified to the following regarding the stop and

frisk:
(Beginning at P. 8 L. 6)
Q: All right. Upon obtaining the registration, what did you do
then?
A: I asked Mr. Cerroni if he had been consuming alcohol tonight,
and he immediately became hostile, he was saying things like...I
hadn't accused him of anything, just asked him for a license and
registration. At that point I asked him to exit the vehicle for
two reasons: One to check for Driving Under the Influence of
alcohol or drugs, and number two, to search for and retrieve the
open containers.
Q: All right, and did he exit the vehicle?
A: He did.
car.

He exited the vehicle and came towards the back of the

Q: All right.
A: At that point I told him that I was going to pat him
down to make sure he had no weapons. (Emphasis added).
(Continued at P. 9 L. 23)
Q: What happened next?
14

A: After I made my intentions known to pat him down and search for
weapons, he immediately pulled on a chain in his pocket and said,
"All I have is this." And my attention was immediately drawn to
the pocket as he was reaching for something.
Q: And were you able to see anything in there, in the pocket?
A: I just saw the chain come out and it had a watch on it.
Q: All right.
A: At that point—
Q: Had it created any noticeable bulge in his pocket you observed?
A: Yeah, that was a watch in his right front
pocket. (Emphasis added)
According to the Terry Court, in order to justify a search
for weapons, an officer must first witness unusual conduct which
may indicate possible criminal activity and present danger. See,
Terry at 30. Graham never mentioned that he felt that his own or
other's safety was ever threatened at the time he told Cerroni to
exit his vehicle.

In fact, Graham testified that he knew the

object in Cerroni's right front pocket looked like a watch.
(Motion to Suppress at 10).

McMahon testified that he did not

feel that his or Graham's safety was ever in jeopardy—McMahon
clearly described the item during the Suppression Hearing as a
small, round object that stuck out possibly an inch.
Suppress at 33).

(Motion to

McMahon also testified that Graham did perform a

Terry frisk of Cerroni. Id. Had Graham had a reasonable belief
that Cerroni was about to commit a crime and Graham felt
threatened, according to the law stated above, Graham was required
to stop the search once he was satisfied Cerroni was not armed.

15

It is clear that no reasonable officer would have concluded
that there was any present dangerf and the search, therefore, was
in violation of Cerroni's Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence
derived from the unconstitutional search should have been
suppressed by the trial court.
POINT III
CERRONI DID HOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PULL THE WATCH
FROM HIS POCKET
The Utah Supreme Court has described a number of factors that
should be considered when determining whether there has been
duress or coercion in obtaining a consent to search.

In State v.

Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980), the Court stated:
Clearly the prosecution has the burden of establishing from
the totality of the circumstances that the consent was
voluntarily given; however, the prosecution is not required
to prove that the defendant knew of his right to refuse to
consent in order to show voluntariness. Factors which may
show a lack of duress or coercion include: (1) the absence of
a claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere
request to search; and (4) the absence of deception or trick
on the part of the officer. [Footnote omitted]
In the case at bar, it is clear that Cerroni did not
voluntarily pull the watch from his pocket. Graham was performing
an illegal Terry frisk of Cerroni just seconds after Cerroni
exited his vehicle. This show of force by the officer placed
Cerroni in a position that was akin to being under arrest.
Cerroni was clearly not free to leave at the time he was being
patted down by the officer. Coupled together, any reasonable
person would have interpreted the officers direction as a command
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and not merely an inquiry.
The officer performed the frisk even though he had no reason
to believe that Cerroni was presently dangerous. Because the
officer did not have any reasonable belief of this, it is clear
that the frisk should not have taken place. But for the illegal
conduct of the officer, Cerroni would never have pulled the watch
from his pocket, and thus the drugs that were found during the
illegal stop and search should have been suppressed by the trial
court.
POINT IV
OFFICER GRAHAM HAD NO RIGHT TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE OBJECT IN
CERRONI'S POCKET ONCE HE WAS CONVINCED IT WAS NOT A WEAPON
In State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996), the Court
held that an officer cannot expand the scope of detention without
independent facts of illegal conduct.
The defendant in that case was stopped by an officer for
loitering in a parking lot while he was sitting in a car with a
friend.

The officer testified that he initially stopped the

defendant because he felt they were violating the loitering
ordinance. Another officer arrived and the defendant was then
asked to step from the car so he could be checked for weapons. Id.
At 448.
Once the defendant was "outside of the vehicle and known to
be unarmed, however, the officers had no reasonable, articulable
suspicion either to continue questioning him regarding weapons or
to search for them." Id. At 453. The Court stated that once the
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officers learned that the defendant was unarmed, any further
questioning was beyond the scope of his detention in the first
place—violating the loitering ordinance.

Id. At 454.

Graham exceeded the scope of the Terry frisk when he inquired
about the object in the front pocket of Cerroni's pocket. Once
Graham learned that Cerroni was unarmed and posed no threat to
either himself or to McMahon, the inquiry should have stopped. It
is clear from the Record that both officers knew it was a watch
and not a weapon in the front pocket of Cerroni's pants.
Therefore, it was improper for Graham to inquire further about the
object.
CONCLUSION
Cerroni's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures was grossly violated when he was stopped by Utah Highway
Patrolman Bruce Graham.

Graham had no probable cause or a

reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Cerroni, and therefore
the stop was not justified at its inception. Moreover, Graham had
no reason to believe that Cerroni was presently dangerous, and
thus the search performed by Graham was unconstitutional. This
Court should remand this case with instructions that the evidence
derived during the illegal stop and search be suppressed.

DATED this

34

day of June, 1998.
R\FREESTONE & ANGRRHOFF
Wayne Ttr Freestone
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant
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No addendum is necessary for this brief.
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